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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K. Solender*
T HE period covered by this Survey Article has seen much activity in the
courts, but little change in the substantive law. 1 The 65th Legislature
made few alterations in the Family Code and the signals for future change
seem to be coming from the federal courts, rather than the Texas courts.
This is primarily because the trial courts in Texas have great discretion in the
area of family law and the state appellate courts generally restrict them-
selves to supervising procedural rules such as venue, filing dates, court
records, and notice. The federal courts, however, are more concerned with
due process, not only as mandated by the Family Code, but also as to how
the provisions of the Family Code are being implemented in practice.2 Some
interesting responses on the part of Texas lawmakers may therefore be
necessary in the future.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Although the Texas Family Code seems to be serving the needs of the
citizens of the state as well as can be expected, grandparents have for some
time felt that their rights have never been adequately recognized. The
legislature apparently agreed, and added a number of provisions to the Code
affecting the rights of grandparents. 3 These new sections provide for the
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
I. Four Texas Supreme Court cases decided during the survey period are omitted because
they were discussed in last year's Survey article: Schiesser v. State, 544 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.
1976); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976); Rogers v. Searle, 544 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.
1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976); see Solender, Family Law: Parent and
Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 133, 150-53 (1977).
2. A recent case indicative of this federal interest is Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977). This case is primarily concerned with "a suit for the
protection of a child in an emergency." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
The court also discussed the standard of proof applicable in suits affecting the parent-child
relationship, id. § 11.15 (Vernon 1975), and suggested that the current standard should be
changed from a "preponderance of the evidence" to a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard. But see Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976), in which the standard is
defined not as "preponderance of the evidence," but as "solid and substantial." Id. at 352.
3. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Subsection (d) of § 14.03 was
strengthened and clarified to read:
If the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child as provided in Section-
14.07 of this code, the court may grant reasonable access rights to either the
maternal or paternal grandparents of the child; and to either the natural maternal
or paternal grandparents of a child whose parent-child relationship has been
terminated or who has been adopted before or after the effective date of this
code. Such relief shall not be granted unless one of the child's legal parents at the
time the relief is requested is the child's natural parent. The court may issue any
necessary orders to enforce said decree.
A reference to subsection (d) was added to § 16.09 to protect the grandparents' interest in the
adoption context: "Nothing in this chapter shall preclude or affect the rights of a natural
maternal or paternal grandparent to reasonable access under Section 14.03(d) of this code." Id.
§ 16.09.
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possible preservation of visitation rights of grandparents even after the
termination of a parent's right to a child. Although a father may have his
parent-child relationship severed, his parents may be granted reasonable
access to the child in their capacity as grandparents. Such visitation rights
should give rise to children with three sets of grandparents: one set of
maternal and two sets of paternal grandparents, or vice versa.
The type of case most directly affected by this change is exemplified by
Ex parte Pepper,4 which involved the fact situation contemplated by the
statute. The litigation in Pepper concerned a judgment for contempt which
had been entered against the natural mother and adoptive father for failure
to comply with a visitation order which had been entered prior to termina-
tion of the natural father's parental relationship. The natural mother and
adoptive father applied for and were granted a writ of habeas corpus by the
court of appeals on the ground that a person may not be imprisoned when
there is no written order of contempt. The court, however, went further and
explained that the order terminating the natural father's parental rights also
terminated as a matter of law the paternal grandparents' legal relationship
with the children. It is important to note that the grandparents were given
notice of the adoption proceedings which resulted in a final decree terminat-
ing their relationship with their grandchildren. The amendments to the
Family Code appear to remove this element of finality from an adoption
decree and permit grandparents to assert their rights at any time.
Although legislative modification of section 14.07 of the Texas Family
Code,' relating to the best interest of the child, may clarify the rights of
grandparents, this modification will probably not change those rights sub-
stantively; the courts have been, even without these changes, considering
grandparents as possible managing conservators after the death of one or
both parents.6
The other change in section 14.077 regarding court interviews with chil-
dren should have little effect on the practice of law in Texas. Greater status,
however, is given to persons twelve to fourteen years old, as heretofore only
persons fourteen years old or older could require consultation with the
court. Because the new law does not change the fact that the court is not
4. 544 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976), writ dism'd, 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.
1977). The amendments, however, will not change the problem raised by In re Herd, 537
S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.): If the maternal grandparents
adopt the child, the paternal grandparents have no standing to assert visitation rights because
neither of the legal parents is a natural parent. See Solender, supra note I, at 153.
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Subsection (b) now reads: "In
determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider the circumstances of the
parents. In the event of the death of the parents, the grandparents may be considered but such
consideration shall not alter or diminish the discretionary power of the court."
6. See Ramirez v. Garcia de Bretado, 547 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no
writ) (court relied on Probate Code to appoint maternal grandmother as guardian of two
children who were "for all practical purposes orphans"). See also Goolsbee v. Heft, 549
S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ) (court granted visitation rights to maternal
grandparents after the death of the child's mother); In re Barrera, 531 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ) (court held maternal grandparents should be considered as
managing conservators). In re Barrera is discussed in Solender, supra note 1, at 140.
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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required to follow the wishes of the child, this amendment appears merely to
be one of emphasis rather than substance. 8
Amendments to section 14. 10 of the Family Code clarify and modify some
of the requirements and procedures for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus
after an alleged child-snatching.9 The intent of the statute is to prevent any
use of self-help by a parent who was not given lawful custody; there are,
however, circumstances where a parent may properly have possession of a
child, but without the benefit of a court order. It is these situations which
subsection (b) attempts to address. As re-written, subsection (b)(l) will
apply only if the prior court did not have jurisdiction of the parties; subsec-
tion (b)(2), however, has been substantially changed. The exception may
now apply in any case where the child has not been in the relator's posses-
sion for at least six months prior to the filing of the writ. This exception is
applicable to intrastate as well as interstate situations.
This change to section 14.10 may have been in response to the problems
that were encountered by a number of trial courts during the past year which
resulted in applications for and acceptances of numerous writs of mandamus
to the Texas Supreme Court. Although a six-month rather than a twelve-
month standard will be applied hereafter, the case of Lamphere v. Chris-
man,10 decided under the old law, may still be important for purposes of
determining when the relevant time period has expired. In Lamphere a
motion to relitigate conservatorship was denied because the child had spent
two months and six days during the previous twelve-month period outside of
Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed this holding, but recognized
that the child did not need to be continuously present within Texas during
the twelve-month period in order to relitigate the custody issue. While
explaining that insignificant visits outside Texas would not be considered in
determining the twelve-month period, the court held that a period of two
months and six days was significant and had to be considered in determining
the twelve-month period. Although it is likely that similar principles will
apply under the six-month rule, the distinction between significant and
insignificant remains undefined.
8. See In re Galliher, 546 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ), in which
the court denied the petition for modification despite the written statement of the 14-year-old
child involved.
9. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Section 14.10 now reads:
[Subsection (a) unaffected]
(b) The court shall disregard any cross action or motion pending for modifica-
tion of the decree determining managing conservatorship, possession, or support
of or access to the child unless it finds that:
(1) The previous order was granted by a court that did not have jurisdiction of
the parties; or(2) the child has not been in the relator's possession and control for at least 6
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for the writ.
[Subsections (c), (d), and (e) unaffected](f) The court shall disregard any motion for temporary or permanent adjudica-
tion relating to the possession of the child in a habeas corpus proceeding brought
under Subsection (e) of this section unless at the time of the hearing an action is
pending under this subtitle, in which case the court may proceed to issue any
temporary order as provided by Section 11.11 of this code.
10. 554 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1977).
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Although the change in subsection 14.10(b)(2) is substantive, it is not
substantial, and a review of the cases decided under the old law indicates
that the outcome would probably have been the same under either law. For
example, the court in Waltreus v. Braddock" would have reached the same
result under either standard since the child had resided in Texas for more
than twelve months immediately preceding the time of filing the writ. Simi-
larly, the outcome of McElreath v. Stewart 2 would probably have been the
same under the new standard since the original custody order appears to
have been valid, and the child was out of the possession of the relator for
less than six months. The court in Fountain v. Nelson 3 might have reached
a different result under the amended statute if the child had been out of the
relator's possession for six months immediately prior to the hearing. The
facts as reported do not make the time periods clear, and it appears that
unless proper time periods can be alleged and proved relief should be
denied. When there is a serious question concerning the welfare of the child,
then subsection 14.10(c) should be used.' 4
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In the past year the United States Supreme Court has continued a case-by-
case analysis of the status of illegitimates, but has yet to propound a fixed
standard for the examination of the rights of illegitimates. This failure has
caused inconsistent results. 15 In Fiallo v. Bell,16 an immigration case, the
Court, in a six-to-three decision, continued to follow a policy of limited
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. In Fiallo the Court held that
Congress can withhold immigration preferences for natural fathers of il-
legitimate United States citizen children and illegitimate children of United
States citizen natural fathers, while granting those preferences to natural
mothers. Although this case is not of immediate importance to Texas law-
makers, it does serve to illustrate the proposition that it is better to be
legitimate than illegitimate.
Trimble v. Gordon, 7 however, may be of real concern in Texas. In that
case the Court, in a five-to-four decision, 8 held a portion of the Illinois
II. 551 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
12. 545 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1977).
13. 546 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
14. See Tooley v. Tooley, 545 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ), where the granting of the writ was affirmed since there was no statement of facts
concerning the allegations.
15. This lack of a fixed standard is illustrated by two lines of cases which the Court has
followed alternately. Compare Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), and Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971), both of which follow a balancing standard, with Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973), Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), which apply a
standard which might be defined as a non-strict scrutiny of suspect classification.
16. 97 S. Ct. 1473, 52 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1977). Fiallo held constitutional 8 U.S.C. §§
I 101(b)(l)(D), I 101(b)(2) (1970).
17. 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977).
18. Three of the Justices dissented on the grounds that this case is constitutionally indistin-
guishable from Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 97 S. Ct. at 1468, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 43(Burger, C.J., Blackmun, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent is
based on the conviction that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment should be
interpreted through historical analysis, and since it is a product of the Civil War it should not be
applied to situations too far removed from race. Id. at 1468-70, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 43-46.
[Vol. 32
FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
Probate Act19 unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The disputed
section was similar to our former section 42 of the Probate Code 21 in that
illegitimate children were permitted to take from and through their mothers,
but not from their fathers. The defendant in Trimble had been adjudged the
father of the child and had been ordered to pay child support, which he did
until he died intestate. Thereafter, the mother filed for determination of
heirship and the Illinois court entered an order identifying the father's
parents and siblings as his only heirs. 21 The Illinois Supreme Court found
that the legislative purpose in changing from non-recognition to partial
recognition of heirship rights for illegitimates was to ameliorate the previous
harsh common law attitude towards illegitimates. 22 The court held that the
distinction between maternity and paternity, resting on the difficulty of
establishing paternity, improved the status of illegitimates and promoted the
orderly disposition of property at death. 23 Although the United States Su-
preme Court agreed that the primary purpose of the statute was to provide a
more just system of state succession for illegitimate children, it held that the
distinction between maternal and paternal intestate succession could not be
"squared with the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 24 While recognizing that the intestate could have taken
steps to assure inheritance for his illegitimate children, the Court ruled that
the essential question is not what the individual can do, but rather "the
constitutionality of discrimination against illegitimates in a state intestate
succession law. " 25
Under the old section 42 of the Texas Probate Code, 26 the illegitimate
child took from and through his mother only. If, however, the child's father
ever married the child's mother, then the child was legitimated and took
from him as any other legitimate heir. Although the Texas Legislature
changed the form of section 42, the only major substantive change concerns
illegitimates who have been legitimated in voluntary legitimation proceed-
ings. 27 These children can take from, but not through, their fathers and,
therefore, will continue to have a lesser status than legitimate children. No
mention is made in the new law regarding the effect of involuntary legitima-
tion, although the Family Code provides that a decree designating the
alleged father as the father of the child creates the same relationship accord-
ed a legitimate child. 21
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Supp. 1976-77).
20. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1956). This section is now amended in TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
21. 97 S. Ct. at 1462, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 35-36.
22. Id. at 1464, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 38.
23. Id. at 1465, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 39.
24. Id. at 1468, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 43.
25. Id. at 1467, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 42.
26. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1956).
27. Id. § 42(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Subsection (c) states:
Where a man, having by a woman a child shall afterwards legitimate the child
pursuant to a voluntary legitimation proceeding under Chapter 13, Family Code,
such child and his issue shall inherit from his father but not from his paternal
kindred; and the father but not the father's kindred, shall inherit from such child
and his issue.
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.09 (Vernon 1975).
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The revision of section 42 seems insufficient to bring the Probate Code
into conformity with the United States Constitution if the rule of Trimble v.
Gordon29 is strictly applied. The provisions of the Family Code relating to
involuntary legitimation might be read into the Probate Code by classifying
these children as products of "marriages null in law,"' 3 but this would still
provide lesser rights for those children whose fathers had taken all possible
steps to recognize them through voluntary legitimation. Legislative purpose
for this discrepancy is difficult to find. Furthermore, if the Family Code
provisions for involuntary legitimation cannot be read into the Probate
Code, then the amendment to section 42 has an even greater chance of being
found to deny equal protection to illegitimate children. There is this greater
chance of unconstitutionality because the involuntarily legitimated child has
been found by a court to be in fact the child of his alleged father and,
therefore, deserving of his support. 3
Questions concerning discipline in the public schools were settled in a
five-to-four decision in Ingraham v. Wright.32 The majority found that the
eighth amendment 33 concept of cruel and unusual punishment does not apply
to corporal punishment as administered by public school teachers or ad-
ministrators, and that in the event the punishment was excessive the usual
common law and criminal remedies would be sufficient. The Court also
found that there is no need for procedural safeguards such as notice and a
hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment. The Court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would "entail a significant intrusion into an area of
primary educational responsibility.- 34 The Court distinguished the earlier
case of Goss v. Lopez, 35 the school suspension case, on the basis that it
involved a state-created property interest, whereas paddling only involved a
liberty interest that must be balanced against educational needs. Ingraham,
while personally important to students, may be more important as an indi-
cator of future abstention by the federal courts in situations involving school
problems such as dress codes and hair lengths. 36
The Texas case of Hogenson v. Williams37 involved a school punishment
situation which arose, as the United States Supreme Court had indicated it
should, in a tort action to recover damages for an assault allegedly commit-
ted on a seventh grade student football player by his coach. The primary
question was whether physical contact is privileged when used for the
29. 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977).
30. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Subsection (e) states: "The issue
also of marriages deemed null at law shall nevertheless be legitimate."
31. This is exactly the same situation as in Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d
31 (1977).
32. 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977).
33. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. 97 S. Ct. at 1418, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 737.
35. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
36. The importance of the Ingraham decision in Texas is indicated by the fact that an
average of 2,000 incidents of physical punishment per month were reported in the 1971-72
school year in the Dallas Independent School District. The Houston Independent School
District reported 8,279 paddlings during a two-month period in 1972. 6 CHILDREN TODAY 19
(1977).
37. 542 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
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purpose of "firing up" or "instilling spirit." 38 The defendant-appellee
contended that this purpose was the equivalent of "instruction and encour-
agement" and, therefore, the contact was privileged.39 The appeals court
disagreed and held that the rule of privileged force only applies in situations
where the teacher reasonably believes such action is necessary to enforce
compliance with a proper command, either given for educational purposes
or to punish prohibited conduct. Accordingly, the case was reversed and
remanded since the verdict was rendered on improper instructions.
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,4° a
case based on New York law, the Supreme Court ruled that foster families,
and, therefore, foster parents, are different from natural or adoptive
families, thereby making it unnecessary to accord them the same procedural
protections. The Court supported this distinction by reasoning that foster
families, unlike natural families, derive their existence from state law and
contractual arrangements. 41 Accordingly, the Court held that foster parents
are not entitled to full judicial review prior to the removal of their foster
children; thus, ten days' notice and a right to a conference which results in
an administrative determination prior to removal is sufficient to protect their
liberty interest. On the other hand, natural parents, who derive their exist-
ence from a blood relationship, apparently have a property interest and,
thus, may be entitled to complete due process rights. The Court did not
mention an independent right of protection attaching to the foster children,
who are the real parties in interest in any disposition dispute between foster
parents, agencies, and natural parents. The similarities between New York
and Texas law regarding the arrangement of temporary care for children
through placement in foster homes should create the same constitutional
rights for Texas foster parents as established in Smith. Accordingly, Smith
should become an especially important decision for the Texas Department
of Human Resources since that agency makes extensive use of foster
parents to provide care for children of parents unable to do so.
Finally, in Carey v. Population Services International42 the Court, in a
complex opinion characterized by many overlapping concurrences and dis-
sents, appears to have held that minors have a right to privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation. College clinics, public clinics, and
private physicians, therefore, should all be able to dispense birth control
information to minors without notifying the parents. Of course, if medical
treatment is involved, parental consent should be obtained in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Texas Family Code.43
III. STATUS
The Texas equal rights amendment" was considered in two cases last
year. The first involved a young girl's desire to play football in the Orange
38. Id. at 459.
39. Id.
40. 97 S. Ct. 2094, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1977).
41. Id. at 2110, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 35.
42. 97 S. Ct. 2010, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1977).
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.01-.03 (Vernon 1975).
44. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
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Junior Football Association.4 5 The district court granted a temporary injunc-
tion in her favor, but the appeals court found insufficient state action and
vacated the injunction despite the fact that practices were held on school
grounds and games were played in public parks. The second case concerned
the right of a married woman to have her name changed back to her maiden
name." The trial court denied the change, reasoning that such a change
would result in " 'the appearance of an illicit cohabitation against the morals
of society,' and be 'detrimental to the institution of the home and family
life,' or that it will be against the best interest of the children."-4 7 The
appellate court, apparently feeling that the denial was on sexist grounds,
reversed, citing Mercer v. Board of Trustees48 to support its view that the
trial court's holding was a denial of equal protection. While the appellate
court specifically commented that followers of traditional social propriety
may not understand appellant's motives, the decision is significant for more
than social propriety. The decision recognizes the change which has been
occurring in some family units in which all family members do not have the
same surname, either bescause the children are products of prior marriages49
or because the wife retains her name at the time of marriage. 50
The problem of defining "reside," as used in the Texas Education Code 5'
was considered in De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School
District.2 The question arose in connection with the school district's denial
of the appellants' right to enroll in a tuition-free education program. While
all of the appellants lived in the district, their parents resided elsewhere and
the persons with whom the appellants lived were neither legally-appointed
guardians nor lawfully in control of the appellants pursuant to orders of the
juvenile court or child welfare agency. The appellants had admitted to the
school admissions officer that they were living in Harlingen in order to
attend the local school. The court found that mere physical presence in a
school district will not satisfy the residency requirements of the statute. The
court further noted that the attorney general of Texas has taken the position
that sending a child to live in another school district for the sole purpose of
obtaining an education in that district is not sufficient to require that a
tuition-free education be provided.5 3
The Texas Supreme Court continued to erode the tort doctrine of intra-
45. Junior Football Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no
writ).
46. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
47. Id. at 359.
48. 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. See, e.g., Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ)(court found that it was not in child's best interest to change her last name to that of her mother
and stepfather, thus sanctioning at least two different surnames in single family unit).
50. TEX. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. H-432 (1974). See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 68 (1975).
51. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978). This subsection states: "The
board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free
schools of the district all persons . . . if such person or his parent, guardian or person having
lawful control resides within the school district."
52. 552 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
53. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. OP. Nos. H-63 (1973), 0-586 (1939).
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family immunity 4 when in Bounds v. Caudle"5 the court partially overruled
the doctrine of complete inter-spousal immunity which had been recognized
in Texas since 1886.56 In Bounds the children of Mrs. Bounds brought a
wrongful death action against their stepfather who, they claimed, had inten-
tionally and willfully caused their mother's death. Relying on case prece-
dent, the appellate court denied the children's wrongful death claim. 57 The
high court, however, held that the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity would
no longer apply to willful or intentional torts, reasoning that preservation of
the family unit is not served by barring such causes of action. The court then
held that since under this ruling the mother, had she lived, could have
asserted a cause of action, her children's derivative cause of action should
also be permitted. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a trial on the
merits.
Parentage is probably the most important factor in establishing the status
of a child, and while maternity is generally established easily, paternity
poses many questions both of fact and law. In two cases considered by the
Fort Worth court of civil appeals, the legal question of paternity was
decided in favor of the alleged fathers, thereby obviating the factual ques-
tion of paternity. 58 In both cases the Texas Department of Public Welfare
had attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction over two alleged fathers
through the use of the tort long-arm statute59 because the Texas Family Code
long-arm statute 6° had not become effective. The Fort Worth appeals court
reversed and held that, since sexual intercourse between consenting adults
is not a tort, the tort long-arm statute could not apply, thereby choosing to
follow Colorado's 6' reasoning rather than that of Illinois. 62
In Alvarado v. Gonzales,63 however, the alleged father pled the one-year
statute of limitations of the Family Code," but the appellate court reversed
and remanded on the ground that the paternity amendments to the Family
Code should not be applied retroactively and, therefore, the one year limita-
tion of the Code did not apply.
In King v. King65 the facts apparently did not sustain a finding that the
alleged father was the biological father. The court held that there had been
54. See Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971), in which an employee-son
was allowed to sue his father's partnership for negligence. The court noted that in ordinary
parent-child situations a suit would not be allowed for ordinary negligence and unintentional
wrongs. Although the court's emphasis on unintentional wrongs may indicate that a child can
sue a parent for an intentional wrong, there is no Texas case law so holding. But see Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.- Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd) (dictum indicates
child may sue parent for an intentional wrong).
55. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 92 (Dec. 3, 1977).
56. Nickerson & Matson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
57. Bounds v. Caudle, 549 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.- Corpus Christi 1977).
58. Postell v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 549 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977, no writ); Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 549 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.- Fort
Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
60. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
61. A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439, 507 P.2d 468 (1973).
62. Poindexter v. Willis, 87 I1. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
63. 552 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
64. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
65. 544 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
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no common law marriage and, therefore, the alleged father was not the legal
father; thus, the mother was the sole parent of the child. The court also
refused to appoint the mother managing conservator since no one else was
claiming adversely to her. Apparently, the entire claim for paternity was
based on the controverted allegation of a common law marriage. A parent-
child relationship in fact between the alleged father and child could not be
determined since a paternity action was not brought.
In Young v. Young 66 the court held that although all three children were
born during the marriage, that fact alone would not be the only criterion for
ordering child support. The trial court found that the two younger children
were conceived and born while the husband and alleged father was in prison.
The court ruled that he could not be the biological father, and ordered him to
pay support for only the older child. The wife had contended that a literal
application of the Family Code67 required the husband to be the father of all
children born during the marriage, but the court disagreed, explaining that
the common law presumption of legitimacy was overcome by proof of non-
access. Napier v. Napier68 quoted Young approvingly in stating that a later
marriage, in this case five years, would not necessarily legitimate a child.
Nevertheless, the court found that there was sufficient evidence submitted
by the alleged father to support a finding that he was, in fact, the father. The
evidence consisted of blood tests which although inconclusive did not rule
out the probability of fatherhood, photographs showing resemblances, and
testimony that there had been sexual relations nine months prior to the birth
of the child.
Although the Texas Family Code has rather elaborate provisions for
formal adoption, 69 status questions may arise after the death of an individual
who allegedly stood in loco parentis to a claimant via the doctrine of
equitable adoption. Texas courts have recognized this concept under two
different theories. One theory is based on an actual agreement to adopt
which was not carried out for some valid reason,7' and the other is based on
the traditional estoppel concept which includes performance by the child
and reception of benefits from the child.7 1 In Adler v. Moran72 the trial court
found an equitable adoption, but the appellate court, after discussing both
possible theories for sustaining the result, reversed and remanded, holding
that the evidence adduced at trial was too confused. The problem experi-
enced is one which may occur with increasing frequency in all areas of the
law since the witnesses were Spanish speaking and their testimony had to be
66. 545 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a) (Vernon 1975). This part of the Code said that "[a]
child is the legitimate child of a man if the child is born or conceived before or during the
marriage of his mother and the man." It should be noted that this subsection has been amended
to read as follows: "A child is the legitimate child of his father if the child is born or conceived
before or during the marriage of his father and mother." Id. (Vernon Supp. 1978) (emphasis
added).
68. 555 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.01-.12, 16.51-.55 (Vernon 1975).
70. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951).
71. Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
72. 549 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ granted).
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given through interpreters. In two other cases the appellate courts affirmed
jury findings that the appellants had not been equitably adopted. 73
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
Controversy concerning managing conservatorship generally arises at the
time of divorce or upon the death of the natural parents. If a permanent and
acceptable settlement of conservatorship can be made at either of these
times, later requests for modification can usually be avoided. Real changes
in circumstances and the impossibility of settlement in some cases, how-
ever, result in a continuing stream of cases requesting modification.
In one case a father, as sole surviving parent, filed a writ of habeas corpus
seeking to regain possession of his daughter who had been in the custody of
the father's brother for the past five years. 74 At the time the answer to the
writ was filed the father's brother and his wife filed a petition for adoption
and termination of the father's parental rights. The trial court denied the
father's writ until there could be a hearing on the uncle's petition for
termination and adoption, and named the uncle as temporary managing
conservator. The father claimed that the court did not have the power to
deny the writ, because, at the time the writ was filed, no actions were
pending affecting the parent-child relationship, and, therefore, he had a
prima facie right to possession. 75 The court, however, found that an action
affecting the parent-child relationship pending at the time of the hearing was
sufficient and ruled that it was in the best interest of the child to maintain the
status quo.
7 6
In re Henson77 was a guardianship case arising after the almost simultane-
ous death of the children's parents. The father had named his brother
guardian of the children in his will, but the mother's sister filed an applica-
tion to be appointed permanent guardian of the person and/or managing
conservator of the children. The trial court found that appointing the aunt as
managing conservator would be in the best interest of the children. The
appeals court agreed, stating that guardianship of the person under the
Probate Code78 is the same as managing conservator under the Family
Code79 and holding that there was jurisdiction to appoint a managing conser-
vator for children without parents or guardian. The uncle contended that he
was entitled to be named the guardian of the person of the children since he
was named in the father's will.' The court, however, found, as a matter of
law, that the uncle owned interests adverse to the children's interests and
was thus disqualified. While the finding of disqualification related to proper-
ty and not fitness for custody, the court indicated that the best interest of the
73. Bowden v. Caldron, 554 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texarkana 1977, no writ); In re
Estate of Wood, 543 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
74. In re Stuart, 544 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.- Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
76. The recent amendment of id. § 14.10(f) would only reinforce this decision.
77. 551 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 229 (Vernon 1956).
79. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02(b) (Vernon 1975).
80. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 117 (Vernon 1956).
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children is of primary concern and found that there was no abuse of discre-
tion.
The court in Benedict v. Benedict8' found that there were "special condi-
tions" at the time of divorce mandating the appointment of the wife and the
wife's parents as joint managing conservators of the children. The appellate
court affirmed this decision as well as the trial court's arrangements for
visitation by the father. The appellate court pointed out that the trial court
need not make specific findings as to the fitness of the parents in order to
determine who should have physical custody of the children. In a later case82
the same appellate court found that appointing both grandparents as manag-
ing conservators was proper when such appointment is in the best interest of
the children. The court pointed out that there is nothing in the Texas Family
Code prohibiting a joint appointment.
In two cases the losing parties alleged misconduct or prejudice on the part
of the trier of fact as grounds for reversal on appeal. In Crapps v. Crapps83
the husband alleged that the court was biased in its decision appointing the
wife managing conservator because the court had commented, after counsel
had closed, that obviously the most important thing was the placement of
the child in the custody of its mother. The appeals court, after reviewing the
record, found that the court's comment was neither a finding of fact nor a
conclusion of law and that the comment only served to indicate the court's
conclusion upon the record that appellee should be named managing conser-
vator. In Tees v. Tees" the husband, who was in the Army, was appointed
managing conservator of the children. The wife's allegation of jury miscon-
duct based upon a juror's statement that she had successfully reared her
family in the military was rejected by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.
In another decision dealing with conservatorship, 85 the trial court's appoint-
ment of a father as managing conservator of the minor child was affirmed,
but the appellate court commented that the use of the phrase "reasonable
visitation rights" to describe the times and the conditions upon which the
possessory conservator can have access to the child was inappropriate
under the current Family Code. Unless the parties agree, however, satisfac-
tory visiting arrangements are difficult for trial courts to spell out. In
Musslewhite v. Musslewhite" the trial court did not include Friday night as
part of the possessory conservator's right of possession. The trial court's
ruling was affirmed as not being an abuse of discretion. On the other hand,
in Corley v. Corley,' where the trial court did not specify visitation times,
the appellate court found an abuse of discretion. The appeals court indicated
that arrangements for visitation should not be left to the discretion of the
possessory conservator and the children without any right of interference
from the managing conservator. The appellate court pointed out that placing
81. 542 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
82. Whitlow v. Mims, 549 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.- Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
83. 546 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
84. 546 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
85. Fergus v. Fergus, 547 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1977, no writ).
86. 555 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
87. 546 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
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this kind of power in the hands of a child can be a burden rather than a
privilege, especially where relations between the parents are hostile.
Normally appellate courts do not delve into the merits of a trial court's
findings when the case involves a change of custody. In re Anglinm is an
exception to this rule. In that case the father asserted that the trial court was
wrong in changing custody back to the mother because a court should not
consider a change in the non-custodial parent's situation as a "material and
substantial" change in circumstances. 89 The trial court had ruled that while
there had been only a change in degree in the father's situation, there had
been such a change in the mother's circumstances that a change in managing
conservatorship was warranted. This ruling was affirmed on the basis that a
change in degree can be a material change. The appellate court also pointed
out that while in this case the material change being considered actually
involved both the custodial and non-custodial parents, ordinarily the "mate-
rial change of conditions" would primarily concern an inquiry into the
custodial parent's situation.
Absence of representation and timely notice of the hearing were the
primary reasons for a reversal and remand in Robinson v. Risinger.90 The
court of civil appeals demonstrated, in a lengthy opinion, that lack of
counsel caused the mother to be at such a disadvantage as to cast doubt on
the validity of the evidence which had served as the basis for the trial court's
findings, thereby necessitating a new trial in the "interest of justice."
In another case9' a change in managing conservatorship was reversed and
the case dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under section 17.05. 2 In this
case the mother had custody as the result of a Colorado divorce; a year later
the father instituted suit in El Paso, Texas, seeking to modify the Colorado
order and make him managing conservator. The father alleged in his petition
that no other court had continuing jurisdiction, but then stated in his plead-
ings that the parties were divorced in Colorado. The court of civil appeals
ruled that the statement in the pleadings put the question of continuing
jurisdiction at issue, thereby requiring the trial court to obtain information
from the Department of Public Welfare as to the identity of the court having
continuing jurisdiction.93 Without this information the question of juris-
diction could not be determined and the lower court judgment was dismissed
without prejudice. Slape v. Slape9 concerns another aspect of continuing
jurisdiction, holding that the continuing jurisdiction of a divorce court can
be destroyed by the subsequent remarriage, either ceremonial or, as alleged
in this case, common law, of the divorcing parties.
When a jury is unable to reach a decision as to custody, the trial judge
cannot enter custody orders on his own without violating the statutory right
to trial by jury. If the parties reach a custody agreement on their own,
88. 542 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
89. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon 1975).
90. 548 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. Brown v. Brown, 555 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
92. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
93. Such inquiry was required pursuant to id. § 11.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
94. 553 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo.1977, no writ).
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however, the court can approve the agreement, thereby obviating the need
for a new jury trial. 95 Interlocutory orders are, of course, not appealable,'
and unless the judgment awards attorney's fees, the fact that the jury found
the amount to be reasonable does not require the court to award them. 7
V. SUPPORT
The courts, the legislature, and the public have all agreed that parents
have a duty to support their children. Parents, however, do not always
realize that the term "parents" includes mothers. Accordingly, when a
father is appointed managing conservator and a mother is ordered to pay
child support, there is likely to be an appeal. This situation occurred in Glass
v. O'Hearn98 where the trial court's judgment ordering the mother to pay
support was affirmed. Although the duration of such support is generally
limited to the child's minority, the Texas Family Code establishes special
rules for handicapped children, making support obligations applicable for
the entire life of the child. 99 This section is not viewed as having retroactive
application, however, and, according to the Texas Supreme Court in Red v.
Red, I°° a court does not have jurisdiction past the age of eighteen unless
some provision for life-long support had been made at the time of divorce.
The Red court went further than the particular facts required and indicated
that a divorce court might not be able to order support payments, at the time
of divorce, for a handicapped child who was already past the age of eighteen
when the suit was instituted.' 1' If this interpretation is more than mere
dictum, remedial legislation would seem to be necessary. The mere fact that
a child is handicapped, however, is not sufficient to create a permanent duty
of support under the Family Code. Rather, the duty is based on the child's
inability to support himself after his eighteenth birthday. Absent such a
showing, a court cannot order indefinite support.'0 2 A trial court can, how-
ever, order relatively high support payments when there is an apparent
special need of the minor children and the parent has the ability to pay. 1 03
Furthermore, a court must first order the beneficiary of a trust to make child
support payments before the trustee can be ordered to make disbursements
95. Taft v. Johnson, 553 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
96. Knipe v. Colpitts, 551 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no
writ); Johnson v. Parish, 547 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
97. Derbonne v. Derbonne, 555 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977,
no writ).
98. 553 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ); cf. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (affirms rule that mother has duty of support, but indicates that it must
be spelled out to be effective). See also Labowitz v. Labowitz, 542 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), where the mother was ordered to pay child support after a change
in managing conservatorship.
99. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (Vernon 1975).
100. 552 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1977).
101. Id. at 94.
102. In Mial v. Mial, 543 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1976, no writ), support
payments of $200 per child per month were ordered for two hemophiliac children, and the
settlement included a trust of $2,750 for their benefit, but the court held that they were not
entitled to support past the age of 18.
103. Jackson v. Jackson, 552 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
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for the child. "4 If the issue of child support has been reserved by the trial
court for future determination, that judgment is interlocutory and not
appealable. 05
Following the entry of a final child support order, the next problem which
often arises is collection. One such case' ° 6 concerning this problem involved
a mother who brought two actions against the father for contempt for failure
to pay court-ordered child support. On the first occasion the father was
given only two days' notice of an order to appear and show cause why he
should not be adjudged in contempt. Both section 14.09(c) of the Texas
Family Code °7 and rule 308-A108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
indicate that an alleged defaulter in child support is allowed ten days' prior
notice of such hearings. Accordingly, the appeals court discharged the
contempt motion due to the lack of sufficient prior notice to the father. The
court stated, however, that failure to give ten days' notice is not, in itself, a
denial of due process.Rather, the court held that the facts and circumstances
of each case determine whether such a denial occurred. °9 One month later
the father was again ordered to appear. This time he was given only nine
days' notice, but the appellate court affirmed the finding of contempt,
reasoning that there was no evidence indicating that the lack of notice had an
adverse effect upon his interest or his ability to assert it." 0
In a related case the father asserted that the trial court did not have
authority to enter a child support judgment during the pendency of an
appeal. The court of civil appeals rejected this assertion because the deci-
sion which the father had appealed was an order of child support and was
not appealable. " Accordingly, the court held that the trial court could enter
its final order regarding child support."I2 A suspended contempt order condi-
tioned upon failure to maintain payments is not self-executing, and a court
may not place a father in jail, when he becomes delinquent, without a
hearing." 3
There are two facets of contempt proceedings, one coercive or civil and
the other punitive or criminal. Therefore, when an individual in a contempt
hearing invokes his constitutional right not to incriminate himself, a court
may not base a penalty on the defendant's own testimony. Ex parte Strin-
104. See In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ)
(interpreting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(c) (Vernon 1975)).
105. Campbell v. Campbell, 550 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
106. Ex parte Sturdivant, 544 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975).
108. TEX. R. Civ. P. 308-A.
109. 544 S.W.2d at 514.
110. Ex parte Sturdivant, 551 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ). See
also Ex parte Trodler, 554 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ); Ex parte
Boyle, 545 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). These appeals are
based on the alleged violation of TEX. R. Civ. P. 308-A, but the courts' rulings are based on Ex
parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1967), and Ex parte Davis, 161 Tex. 561, 344 S.W.2d 153
(1961).
Ill Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 551 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ
dism'd).
112. Id. at 147.
113. Expane Sauser, 554 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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ger" 4 involved a situation in which the husband at the time of divorce was
ordered to place $11,000 into the wife's bank account in lieu of child
support. The husband failed to deposit the money and was forced to testify
at the contempt hearing that he did not have the money because he had spent
it during one month "having a good time."11 5 The trial court then ordered
Mr. Stringer confined for 150 days or until he purged himself by payment of
the judgment. The appellate court pointed out that the contempt order would
have been merely coercive if Mr. Stringer had been granted immunity from a
punitive order, but since this was not done the contempt order was so
prejudiced that it could not stand." 6 Contempt, of course, is not the only
remedy available to trial courts in attempting to enforce child support
orders. Entering a money judgment" 7 and ordering a set-off against other
property'1 8 are alternatives available to enforce support orders."19
When a divorce decree requires that a child be named as beneficiary of an
insurance policy, a failure by the insured to change the named beneficiary
will not defeat the original decree. In Wunsche v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society120 the insured, pursuant to a divorce settlement, agreed to maintain
life insurance, then in the name of his mother, for the benefit of his
daughter. The name on the policy was never changed to comport with the
agreement; however, the trial court's ruling that a constructive trust had
been created for the benefit of the child was affirmed by the appellate court.
In Tomlinson v. Lackey' 21 the El Paso court of civil appeals, relying on
Wunsche, reached the same result in a similar factual situation.
The parent-child long-arm statute of the Texas Family Code 22 was tested
in Zeisler v. Zei$ler.123 In this case, pursuant to a 1971 Texas divorce decree,
the mother, a resident of Georgia at the time of the suit, was receiving child
support payments through the Dallas County support office from the hus-
band who was then a resident of Florida. The mother was asking for an
increase in support payments. The husband moved to dismiss on the basis of
no personal jurisdiction. The trial court heard the merits before finding that
it had no jurisdiction. The appellate court ruled that the due process test as
stated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 24 was satisfied since there
were sufficient continuing contacts with Texas to establish personal juris-
diction. Accordingly, the decision was reversed and rendered in accordance
with the trial court's findings.
The question of venue also continues to be contested even though the
114. 546 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, no writ).
115. Id. at 842.
116. For a different handling of an equally exasperating case see Exparte Preston, 162 Tex.
379, 347 S.W.2d 938 (1961).
117. Dabney v. Dabney, 548 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1977, no writ).
118. Stephens v. Stephens, 543 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no
writ).
119. Id.
120. 551 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
121. 555 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1977, no writ).
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
123. 553 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).
124. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also O'Brien v. Lanpar, 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
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Texas Family Code provides that venue lies in the county where the child
resides in all suits affecting the parent-child relationship, unless there is a
court with continuing jurisdiction. These principles were applied in Adair v.
Patterson. 125
Trial courts are beginning to take into account the increased cost of living
when modification of support payments is at issue. Upward modification
was approved in both a private'26 and a foster care support case. 2 7 Upward
modification is not automatic, however, because in situations where the
former husband is unable to pay increased support the court is not likely to
grant modification. 28 An interesting aspect of all three cases above is that
the wife's earning capacity was considered as part of the evidence to
determine ability to pay. Furthermore, the earning capacity of a second wife
will be considered if the husband's inability to pay is in issue.
The dispute in Boyd v. Boyd'2 9 arose over the construction of a settlement
agreement which gave the mother "sole and absolute" discretion in the use
of the money for the support and maintenance of herself and the children.
When the husband became managing conservator of two of the children, he
withheld a portion of the monthly payment on the grounds that the money
should be expended on the children. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on the amount of the arrearage, but failed to answer specifically the
husband's request for a declaratory judgment concerning the children's right
to a portion of the money. The court of civil appeals found that the trial
court had not disposed of the declaratory judgment question, apparently
holding that silence does not give consent, and dismissed the appeal pending
a clear resolution of the question.
The difficulties of using the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, 130 or URESA, another vehicle for obtaining enforcement of child sup-
port, are demonstrated by Holmes v. Tibbs .131 In Holmes the responding
trial court attempted to raise the amount of support without a finding from
the initiating state. The appellate court reversed, holding that the proof was
insufficient because the only evidence presented to the court was the origi-
nal court order for support payments of $20 per week. The appellate court
reasoned that the court-ordered support payments must be presumed suffi-
cient without contrary evidence.
In Solomon v. Solomon 32 jurisdiction rather than evidence was at issue.
The court held that no court has continuing jurisdiction regarding pre-1974
support orders, and, therefore, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter
the order. In another support case a cross action concerning alleged arrear-
ages was denied on the ground of res judicata since the action had been
125. 551 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
126. Lambert v. Lambert, 545 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ).
127. Rodgers v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 548 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977,
no writ).
128. Watley v. Watley, 542 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1976, no writ).
129. 545 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon 1975).
131. 542 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
132. 546 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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previously litigated under the URESA provisions.'33 The case may have
been wrongly decided in 1974, but there was a final judgment and no appeal
was taken therefrom, so that this action could only be construed as a
collateral attack on the prior judgment; consequently, the trial court was
without jurisdiction.
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
In matters concerning the welfare of children, the state has the power to
intervene whenever necessary. This power, however, is not unlimited, and
proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship must comport with
due process. The Texas Supreme Court in Goffney v. Lowry134 ruled that an
indigent mother did not have to exhaust all potential sources of charity in
order to prove inability to pay the costs of an appeal; she was, therefore,
granted a mandamus allowing her to appeal without securing costs. In the
case of In re R.E. W. 135 a trial court's termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship was reversed and remanded despite extensive testimony; the evi-
dence was not sufficiently convincing to show that the mother had knowing-
ly placed or allowed her child to remain in an environment which en-
dangered the child. 36 The court of civil appeals went on to state that an
evidentiary standard of "beyond, a reasonable doubt" would be too stringent
on remand, since that standard might be detrimental to the child, the party
most needing protection. The court in Higgins v. Dallas County Child
Welfare Unit137 agreed with the court in R.E. W. that the evidentiary stan-
dard of the Texas Family Code was not unconstitutional, and further held
that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish child abuse. The
court cautioned, however, that each parent should be judged as an individu-
al in a child abuse case; thus, the husband and wife should not be joined
together in the special issues submitted to the jury. In re S.H. ,138 another
termination proceeding, was reversed and remanded because the petition
merely alleged that termination would be in the best interest of the child and
did not specify any acts supporting the judgment of termination. 39
The state did prevail on appeal in a few termination cases. The trial
court's termination in H. W.J. v. State Department of Public Welfare"O was
affirmed based on the ground that imprisonment resulting from a father's
conscious act, and having the effect of placing or leaving his children in
dangerous circumstances, is conduct justifying the termination of parental
rights. The court underscored its holding that mere imprisonment was not
the basis for the decision, since that cannot be construed as intentional
133. Howard v. Brizendine, 546 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
134. 554 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. 1976).
135. 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. The state was relying on the provisions for involuntary termination of parental rights.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
137. 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
138. 548 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
139. On the other hand, Whiteside v. Dresser, 543 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), was reversed and remanded because the jury was asked only to find on the
father's actions and not also on the best interest of the child. Both elements must be found
against the parent in order to terminate parental rights. See Solender, supra note 1, at 150.
140. 543 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
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abandonment. In another case the trial court, while not terminating the
mother's parental rights, did deny the return of the children and chose to
appoint Child Welfare as temporary managing conservator. The appeals
court affirmed, 4' holding that the ruling was not inconsistent since a trial
court has wide discretion in child custody cases.
Two recent cases are important for their impact on the requirements of
notice to fathers of illegitimate children. In the first case, T.D.E. v Christian
Child Help Foundation,142 an especially interesting situation was presented
in connection with the termination of a father's parental rights after the
child's mother had voluntarily placed the child with an adoption agency. The
agency, seeking to terminate the rights of both parents, was met with
opposition from the father who had filed to legitimate the child. The agency
opposed legitimation and alleged that the father had engaged in conduct
which would endanger the child. The father contended that he did not know
that the child's mother had become pregnant until he was notified of the suit
to terminate. He did admit, however, that he had had relations with the
child's mother, had left his wife, had lived with the child's mother, and had
then abandoned her to return to his wife. A psychiatrist testified that a
mother might feel anxious and rejected in these circumstances and that she
might not take proper care of herself, which could result in harm to the
fetus. The jury found against the father and the appellate court affirmed,
stating that there was evidence which showed that a fetus may be en-
dangered by the father's conduct when such conduct causes emotional
stress to the mother during pregnancy. This holding is unusual since the
conduct, in this case an act of abandonment, was knowingly engaged in only
with regard to the mother. It would seem impossible to engage voluntarily in
conduct with regard to some thing or person whose existence is unknown,
that is, a fetus. If this reasoning stands, the right of a father to notice under
Stanley v. Illinois 141 will be seriously eroded. The protections of Stanley will
not be eroded by failure to serve process, but rather by a mother's unilateral
decision not to disclose her pregnancy, thereby causing the father inadver-
tently to act contrary to his own child's interests.
The court in Rogers v. Lowry' 44 presented a more conventional view of
the Stanley notice requirements, holding that a biological father was entitled
to notice even in the case of a stepfather's adoption of an illegitimate child.
This view was adopted even though the biological father had not asserted
any rights to the child. The court did not accept the mother's contention that
no notice was needed, thereby rejecting her assertion that no relationship
needed to be terminated since such a father was not a parent as defined by
the Family Code. 145 Assuming, however, that the mother had concealed the
141. Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1977, no writ).
142. 550 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley recognizes that all fathers, even those of illegitimate
children, have an interest in their children which entitles them to notice before their rights can
be severed.
144. 546 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
145. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
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child's existence from the biological father, the notice protections would be
of little use under the ruling in T.D.E. because the biological father could be
held to have voluntarily abandoned the fetus. Notice to a biological father
should do more than foreclose his rights automatically.
Although the two-step adoption process of the Texas Family Code,"4 as
well as provisions of the Texas Penal Code, 14 7 have tended to discourage
private placements, there is some litigation in the area. For example, litiga-
tion has arisen in the situation where the mother changes her mind while an
attorney is serving as an intermediary. Myers v. Patton"4 is one such case
where the mother after birth of the child, but while still in the hospital,
voluntarily signed an affidavit of relinquishment of her child and then
changed her mind. The trial court terminated parental rights on the basis of
abandonment and further found that there was no undue influence on the
part of the attorney, explaining that the only pressure came from the mother
herself who felt she lacked the ability to care for and support the child. The
mother also contested the constitutionality of the provisions in the Family
Code which permit the waiving of process prior to the filing of suit.' 49 The
appellate court, however, dismissed this argument on the basis of rulings by
the United States Supreme Court 50 and found that the mother had voluntari-
ly, intelligently, and knowingly waived her rights with full awareness of the
legal consequences.
Problems are generated when a mother desires to have her child returned
to her after she had left him in a stable environment for an extended period
of time because she was unable to care for him. Such a situation was
presented to the court in In re E.S.M. ;151 the couple who had cared for the
child for over two years brought a suit to terminate the parent-child relation-
ship so that they might adopt the child. the trial court ruled that the parental
rights should be terminated, but apparently had difficulty writing a judgment
which conformed to the requirements of the Family Code. After the clerical
errors had been corrected, however, the appeals court affirmed on grounds
that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the mother had engaged
in conduct which endangered the child and that termination was in the
child's best interest. The court acknowledged the strong presumption that a
child's best interest is served by keeping him in the custody of the natural
parents, but found that the presumption had been overcome. A similar but
more difficult problem arose in Reed v. Wormley152 where the paternal
grandparents sought termination of the rights of the mother and the biologi-
cal father, their son, and appointment of themselves as managing conser-
vators. As in the preceding case, the court found sufficient evidence that the
mother had allowed the child to remain in dangerous surroundings and that
146. Id. § 16.03 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
147. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
148. 543 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
149. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (Vernon 1975).
150. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
151. 550 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. 554 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
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the child's best interest would be served by terminating the parent-child
relationship. It is interesting to note that the child's father was a friendly
witness for his parents, although his own rights were also terminated.
Another case'53 involving grandparents was based on an entirely different
fact situation. In this case the maternal grandparents sought to have the
father's parental rights terminated after he had stabbed the children's
mother to death. The court found that the contradictory evidence as to
whether or not the stabbing occurred in the children's presence was immate-
rial since the children feared blood and knives, and held that the father had
engaged in conduct which endangered the children's physical and emotional
well-being. In view of the unusual facts in this case, the appeals court
apparently did not scrutinize this proceeding as strictly as in the two cases
just discussed; the appellate court accepted testimony of relatives and
friends as to the psychological condition of the children, rather than requir-
ing expert testimony. Furthermore, the court was willing to presume the
existence of a lower court finding that termination was in the best interest of
the children rather than requiring such a conclusion to be explicitly stated as
did the court in Whiteside v. Dresser.5 4
153. In re B.J.B., 546 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. 543 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see note 139 supra.
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